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From an Ontological Point of View$
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John Heil

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259748

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199259747.001.0001

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Universals

Universals

Chapter:
(p.126) Chapter 12 Universals
Source:
From an Ontological Point of View
Author(s):

John Heil (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199259747.003.0012

An ontology that admits properties can treat properties as universals or particulars. Universals can be transcendent Platonic entities or in rebus: wholly present in each of their instances (and nowhere else). If properties are universals, similarity is reducible to identity: objects are similar by virtue of sharing constituents. This advantage is not enough to compensate for striking disadvantages, however.

Keywords:   D. M. Armstrong, in rebus, mode, one‐over‐many, Plato, possible worlds, property, set, similarity, sparse, transcendent, trope, universal, way

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