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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality$
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Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199257362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001

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Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action

Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action

Chapter:
(p.97) 4 Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action
Source:
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Author(s):

Christine Tappolet (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199257361.003.0005

What is the role of emotions in akratic action? Proposing that emotions are non‐conceptual perceptions of values, the author argues that such states have the capacity not just to cause but also to render intelligible actions that are contrary to one's better judgement. Akratic actions prompted by an emotion may even be more rational than following one's evaluative judgement, for the perception might enable the agent to better track the reasons she has, compared to the judgement. By contrast, akratic actions in which no emotion is involved (cases of ‘cool’ akrasia) are genuinely puzzling and of dubious intelligibility.

Keywords:   akrasia, attention, Davidson, emotions, non‐conceptual content, perception of values, rational agency, Ronald de Sousa

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