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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality$
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Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199257362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001

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Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory

Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory

Chapter:
(p.251) 10 Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory
Source:
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Author(s):

Joseph Heath (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199257361.003.0011

Any theory of practical irrationality necessarily imposes a division of labour between an account of the agent's intentional states and how these are formed, and an account of how these intentional states get applied in particular circumstances to choose a particular action. Nevertheless, questions that concern the content of the agent's beliefs and desires are still routinely lumped together with questions that deal with the way the agent chooses in the light of these beliefs and desires. This generates a number of pseudoproblems. Seeks to clarify some of them, by considering the internal structure of decision theory.

Keywords:   decision theory, deontic constraint, discounting, rule following, temptation, ultimatum game

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