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Consciousness and the World$
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Brian O'Shaughnessy

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256723

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199256721.001.0001

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Imagination and Perception

Imagination and Perception

Chapter:
(p.371) 13 Imagination and Perception
Source:
Consciousness and the World
Author(s):

Brian O'Shaughnessy (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199256721.003.0014

The aim is to distinguish imagining‐of from thought‐of a phenomenal object, and ultimately to differentially distinguish perception‐of a phenomenal object from these close experiential neighbours. Now there is a special negation of imagination, in that imaginings are of necessity not the prototype. This joins the identity‐heading as a criterion for distinguishing the above three varieties of experience. Thus, perception takes direct objects and discovers its identity autonomously under ‘perceive’, but takes no negative objects and no negative propositional objects. The perceptual imagination takes direct objects, finds its identity non‐autonomously under ‘imagine‐of perceiving’, and takes no negative objects, while the propositional imagination takes both positive and negative propositional objects. Then whereas thought probably takes no direct objects, if it could do so such an event would autonomously discover its identity under ‘thought‐of’, and in any case thought takes both positive and negative propositional objects. Finally, we can add to this list the perceptual discovery‐experience, already demarcated in Ch. 10. This differentially demarcates perception.

Keywords:   imagination, imagining, object, object of perception, perception, perceptual object, propositional, thought

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