The chapter analyses a leading argument for scepticism, according to which one has the same evidence in one's actual case as in a sceptical scenario in which one is deceived and therefore does not know which case one is in. The sceptic's argument for the sameness of evidence depends on the idea that one must always be in a position to know what one's evidence is, but this idea is refuted by a version of the anti‐luminosity argument. Thus, we are not compelled to accept the sceptic's original argument. Appeals to indiscriminability do not help the sceptic. That we are not always in a position to know what our evidence is has unsettling implications for the nature of rationality, since it is rational to proportion belief to the evidence.
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