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Knowledge and its Limits$
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Timothy Williamson

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256563

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019925656X.001.0001

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Sensitivity

Sensitivity

Chapter:
(p.147) 7 Sensitivity
Source:
Knowledge and its Limits
Author(s):

Timothy Williamson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019925656X.003.0008

Philosophers such as Robert Nozick have argued that knowledge must be sensitive, in roughly the sense that if what one knew had been false, one would not have believed it. Such a counterfactual constraint has been used to explain the appeal of scepticism. This chapter argues that no version of the constraint is correct. It also criticizes the variant of Nozick's approach developed by Keith DeRose on which the standard for the application of the word ‘know’ depends on the conversational context. A version of the argument given by Hilary Putnam that if one was a brain in a vat, one could not think that one was constructed using perceptual demonstrative expressions.

Keywords:   brain, counterfactual, demonstrative, DeRose, Nozick, Putnam, scepticism, vat

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