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Knowledge and its Limits$
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Timothy Williamson

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256563

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019925656X.001.0001

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Evidential Probability

Evidential Probability

Chapter:
(p.209) 10 Evidential Probability
Source:
Knowledge and its Limits
Author(s):

Timothy Williamson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019925656X.003.0011

The chapter bases a theory of evidential probability on the equation of knowledge with evidence. It is a form of objective rather than subjective Bayesianism. Updating on new evidence is structured in a way that allows propositions to lose as well as gain probability (forgetting). The account is integrated with possible worlds models of epistemic logic. Since one does not always know what one knows, the accessibility relation is not an equivalence relation, which has the effect that prior probability can diverge from expected posterior probability.

Keywords:   Bayesian, epistemic logic, evidential probability, forgetting, possible worlds, updating

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