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The Four-Category OntologyA Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199254392

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199254397.001.0001

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The Concept of an Object in Formal Ontology

The Concept of an Object in Formal Ontology

Chapter:
(p.69) 5 The Concept of an Object in Formal Ontology
Source:
The Four-Category Ontology
Author(s):

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199254397.003.0005

The formal ontological concept of an object is explicated and contrasted with that of a property. F. P. Ramsey’s objections to this distinction are challenged. The sense in which objects possess an individuality not exhibited by entities of certain other types is discussed. The object/property distinction is distinguished from that between universals and particulars. The ontological status of events and processes, and that of abstract entities such as numbers, are examined. Gottlob Frege’s treatment of number and his object/concept distinction are criticized, and an alternative account of the ontological status of concepts is advanced.

Keywords:   concepts, events, Gottlob Frege, individuality, numbers, objects, properties, F. P. Ramsey, universals

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