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The Four-Category OntologyA Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199254392

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199254397.001.0001

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Some Formal Ontological Relations

Some Formal Ontological Relations

Chapter:
(p.34) 3 Some Formal Ontological Relations
Source:
The Four-Category Ontology
Author(s):

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199254397.003.0003

The notion of a formal ontological relation is introduced and illustrated. Distinctions are drawn between various types of ontological dependence relations. The hierarchical character of systems of ontological categories is examined, together with the ontological status of such categories themselves. It is argued that neither ontological categories nor formal ontological relations, such as instantiation and characterization, should be regarded as elements of being, that is, as entities in their own right. A distinction is drawn between form and content in ontology, paralleling but distinct from a similar distinction commonly made in logic.

Keywords:   categories, characterization, formal ontological relations, instantiation, logical form, ontological form, ontological dependence

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