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The Four-Category OntologyA Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199254392

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199254397.001.0001

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Truthmaking, Necessity, and Essential Dependence

Truthmaking, Necessity, and Essential Dependence

Chapter:
(p.192) 12 Truthmaking, Necessity, and Essential Dependence
Source:
The Four-Category Ontology
Author(s):

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199254397.003.0012

The notion of truthmaking is examined. A distinction is drawn between formal ontological predicates — which should not be taken to denote elements of being — and other predicates, with ‘is true’, ‘exists’, and ‘is identical with’ belonging to the former class. Metaphysical realism is defended in the face of W. V. Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. Various species of metaphysical dependence are identified, and an account of truthmaking as a species of essential dependence is proposed and defended. It is explained how contingent truths are possible, given this account and the framework of the four-category ontology.

Keywords:   categories, contingency, essential dependence, formal ontological predicates, metaphysical realism, W. V. Quine, truthmaking, truth

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