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EvidentialismEssays in Epistemology$
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Earl Conee and Richard Feldman

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199253722

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199253722.001.0001

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The Justification of Introspective Beliefs

The Justification of Introspective Beliefs

Chapter:
(p.199) 8 The Justification of Introspective Beliefs
Source:
Evidentialism
Author(s):

Richard Feldman (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199253722.003.0009

Addresses an important challenge to any evidentialist view of the justification that conscious states provide. The challenge strongly suggests that something other than evidence plays a central role in epistemic justification, something like reliability or intellectual virtue. It is argued that nothing beyond evidence is needed.

Keywords:   basic beliefs, classical foundationalism, introspection, phenomenal concepts, problem of the speckled hen, safety of beliefs, Ernest Sosa, virtuous beliefs

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