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EvidentialismEssays in Epistemology$
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Earl Conee and Richard Feldman

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199253722

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199253722.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 November 2019

The Ethics of Belief

The Ethics of Belief

(p.166) 7 The Ethics of Belief

Richard Feldman (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes that we epistemically ought to have. An evidentialist thesis about the attitudes we epistemically ought to have is supported.

Keywords:   William Alston, doxastic voluntarism, epistemic duties, epistemic obligation, epistemic value, epistemology and ethics, ethics of belief, role ought

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