Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
EvidentialismEssays in Epistemology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199253722

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199253722.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 November 2019

Heeding Misleading Evidence

Heeding Misleading Evidence

(p.259) 11 Heeding Misleading Evidence

Earl Conee (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Knowing a proposition appears to justify dismissing any evidence against that proposition as misleading. Yet a dismissal of evidence is dogmatic and belief against sufficiently strong evidence is never epistemically justified. It is argued in response that the problem can be resolved by applying an evidentialist view of the justification that is required for knowledge. Although knowledge includes evidence that helps justify judgments to the effect that contrary evidence is misleading, we do not thereby become justified in disregarding contrary evidence.

Keywords:   James Cargile, defeaters, evidence, junk knowledge, modus ponens

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .