In this essay, McGinn argues for a version of ‘modal realism’ that denies the reality of possible worlds. Central to this discussion is a distinction between objectual and non‐objectual interpretations of modal expressions. Objectual interpretations affirm the reality of possible worlds, the existence of which McGinn flatly denies; whereas on the non‐objectual alternative, the semantic role of modal expressions is non‐referential. According to McGinn, the modal truth is to be grounded not in a realist ontology of possible worlds but in the manner in which real objects have the properties they do. In this way, McGinn remains a modal realist by locating modality in the modes of objects.
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