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Knowledge and RealitySelected Essays$
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Colin McGinn

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251582

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199251584.001.0001

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Two Notions of Realism?

Two Notions of Realism?

Chapter:
(p.267) 13 Two Notions of Realism?
Source:
Knowledge and Reality
Author(s):

Colin McGinn (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199251584.003.0014

McGinn's narrow aim in this essay is to complicate Dummett's simplistic, logico‐linguistic formulation of the debate between realism and anti‐realism, by undermining the presumption that the law of bivalence captures the intuitive notion of realism. Drawing on a wide variety of illustrations (e.g. statements of personal identity, ethical statements, Quinean theories of radical interpretation, mathematical statements), McGinn counters that realism is better characterized as the claim of evidence independence, arguing that this claim is independent of the truth or falsity of bivalence. Thus, McGinn's wider aim is to formulate the dispute between realism and anti‐realism as a metaphysical, rather than logico‐linguistic, debate.

Keywords:   anti‐realism, bivalence, Dummett, evidence, indeterminacy, law of bivalence, meaning, Quine, radical interpretation, realism, semantics, truth, vagueness

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