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Reflections on Meaning$
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Paul Horwich

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251247

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/019925124X.001.0001

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Norms of Truth and Meaning

Norms of Truth and Meaning

Chapter:
(p.104) 5 Norms of Truth and Meaning
Source:
Reflections on Meaning
Author(s):

Paul Horwich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019925124X.003.0005

Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative concepts. One element of this argument is a discussion of why true belief is desirable. Another element is a demonstration — in case meaning is a matter of implicitly following rules for the use of words — that such rule following can be analyzed in terms that are purely naturalistic (i.e., non-normative and non-semantic).

Keywords:   truth, meaning, evaluative, normative, Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, Boghossian, rule following, naturalistic

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