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Incentives and Political Economy$
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Jean-Jacques Laffont

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248681

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199248680.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 August 2019

Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation

Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation

Chapter:
(p.154) 7 Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation
Source:
Incentives and Political Economy
Author(s):

Jean‐Jacques Laffont (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199248680.003.0007

This chapter discusses the choice of economic instruments for environmental policy in the political economy framework of imperfect information and the need to provide incentives for political majorities. Models of command‐and‐control regulation and interest groups competition are presented. These models are then extended to study the impact of the dynamics of re‐election based on campaign contributions.

Keywords:   campaign contributions, command‐and‐control regulation, environmental policy, imperfect information, incentives, interest groups, political economy, political majority, re‐election dynamics

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