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Incentives and Political Economy$
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Jean-Jacques Laffont

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248681

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199248680.001.0001

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Political Economy and Industrial Policy

Political Economy and Industrial Policy

Chapter:
(p.101) 5 Political Economy and Industrial Policy
Source:
Incentives and Political Economy
Author(s):

Jean‐Jacques Laffont (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199248680.003.0005

This chapter considers a variety of issues in industrial policy by modelling the trade‐off between informational rents and efficiency distortions. It is shown that political imperfections affect regulatory rules and that the ownership structure of firms matters. Price distortions and the rationale behind prohibiting price discrimination are analysed and the models are extended to include the possibility of lump sum transfers by the government.

Keywords:   efficiency distortion, firms, industrial policy, informational rent, lump sum transfers, ownership structure, price discrimination, price distortion

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