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The Economy of EsteemAn Essay on Civil and Political Society$
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Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246489

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199246483.001.0001

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Multiple Equilibria and Bootstrapping Performance

Multiple Equilibria and Bootstrapping Performance

Chapter:
(p.125) 7
Source:
The Economy of Esteem
Author(s):

Geoffrey Brennan (Contributor Webpage)

Philip Pettit (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199246483.003.0008

Sometimes esteem (or disesteem) is assigned by reference not to quality of performance but rather to whether the actor has acted in accordance with some norm. Feedback effects can arise in this case as well, because the amount of esteem/disesteem assigned for compliance/non-compliance is likely to be a function of the number of conformers. Equilibrium analysis is undertaken for this case. A distinctive feature is that there are likely to be two possible stable equilibria: one a positive esteem, low-compliance equilibrium and the other a disesteem, high compliance equilibrium. The multiple equilibria property raises the question of ‘boot strapping’ from the lower to the higher equilibrium. We investigate that possibility in the context of a more general comparative static analysis.

Keywords:   boot strapping, compliance levels, multiple equilibria, norms

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