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The Architecture of DemocracyConstitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy$
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Andrew Reynolds

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246465

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199246467.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 August 2019

Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve

Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve

Chapter:
(p.248) 9 Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve
Source:
The Architecture of Democracy
Author(s):

Rein Taagepera (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199246467.003.0010

Addresses three issues. On what basis are electoral rules actually chosen in new democracies, and what are the consequences? On what basis should they ideally be designed? And in how much detail should the electoral rules be specified in constitutions?

Keywords:   constitutional design, electoral rules

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