Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Essays on Actions and Events$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Donald Davidson

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246274

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199246270.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 August 2019

Intending

Intending

Chapter:
(p.83) 5 Intending
Source:
Essays on Actions and Events
Author(s):

Donald Davidson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199246270.003.0005

This essay picks up where Essay 4 left off: how best to specify the desire and belief that rationalize and cause an action? A conjunction of desire and belief rationalize an action only when that action is suitably described; also, the desire must be expressed so that we can arrive at an action and to that end must be formulated as an explicit value judgement, says Davidson. He then proceeds to make precise the claim that rationalizing desires and beliefs must cause their action in the right as opposed to a ‘deviant’ way, i.e. the causal chain must proceed as the rationalization tells us. Davidson notes a further problem for his analysis in Essay 1: if I intend to do something but never get round to do it, my intention cannot be identified with an action it rationalizes and causes, and if I form an intention on the basis of no prior deliberative process, then I cannot identify it with any beliefs and desires I held at the time; either case seems to warrant reintroducing distinct intentions or ‘acts of will’ into our ontology. Investigating various entities they can be identified with––actions, beliefs that one will act, a form of wanting––Davidson identifies such ‘pure intendings’ as conditional value judgements and ordinary intentions as all‐out ones.

Keywords:   all‐out value judgments, causal theory of action, condtional value judgements, desires expressed by value judgements, intending, pure intending, rationalization

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .