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The Uses of SenseWittgenstein's Philosophy of Language$
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Charles Travis

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199245871

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199245878.001.0001

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The Limits of Doubt

The Limits of Doubt

Chapter:
(p.188) 5 The Limits of Doubt
Source:
The Uses of Sense
Author(s):

Charles Travis (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199245878.003.0005

Explores the S‐use sensitivity of proof, arguing that there is no clear separation between an epistemic and non‐epistemic notion of proof, but that epistemology is involved in what actually entails what (which is thus an occasion‐sensitive matter). It defends a view of G. E. Moore.

Keywords:   doubt, entailment, G.E. Moore, occasion‐sensitivity, possibility, proof, Wittgenstein

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