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Objects and Persons$
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Trenton Merricks

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199245369

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199245363.001.0001

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Surviving Eliminativism

Surviving Eliminativism

(p.85) 4 Surviving Eliminativism
Objects and Persons

Trenton Merricks (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

I argue that we human organisms—though composite—are not mere overdeterminers. We cause, by way of having conscious mental properties, some effects that our constituent atoms do not cause. (My defence of this claim involves considerations regarding supervenience. I argue that our existing and having conscious mental properties does not supervene on the features of, and relations among, our microphysical parts.) Because mental causation makes us causally non‐redundant, we are not eliminated by the overdetermination argument of Ch. 3.

Keywords:   causation, eliminativism, human organism, mental causation, overdetermination, overdetermination argument, person, supervenience

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