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The Government of RiskUnderstanding Risk Regulation Regimes$
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Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199243631

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199243638.001.0001

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Interests, Lobbies, and Experts

Interests, Lobbies, and Experts

Chapter:
(p.112) 7 Interests, Lobbies, and Experts
Source:
The Government of Risk
Author(s):

Christopher Hood (Contributor Webpage)

Henry Rothstein (Contributor Webpage)

Robert Baldwin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199243638.003.0007

Explores the logic of basing risk regulation on the interests of cohesive organized groups inside or outside the bureaucracy, including patterns of capture by professions as well as by orthodox producer capture. The chapter explores the extent and conditions in which state regulation of the nine case‐study risks is driven by such forces. Analysis suggests that activity by organized interests has powerful explanatory force and can help explain a number of regime features that are anomolous from market‐failure and opinion‐responsive perspectives, especially when the interests of regulatory professionals are taken into account. Moreover, careful analysis reveals that different regulatory components of the same regime, such as standard‐setting and enforcement, may be shaped by different sets of organized interests.

Keywords:   capture, enforcement, organized interests, regulation, regulators, risk, standards

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