Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Truth and the Absence of Fact$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Hartry Field

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199242894

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 July 2019

Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse

Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse

Chapter:
(p.222) 8 Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse
Source:
Truth and the Absence of Fact
Author(s):

Hartry Field (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199242895.003.0008

Some discourse (e.g. involving vague or indeterminate terms, normative language, or conditionals) can seem ‘factually defective’: it generates issues about which there seems to be ‘no fact of the matter’. But there seems to be a difficulty in making sense of factually defective discourse, and in explaining the division between it and other discourse, if one holds that the basic notion of truth is a fairly minimal one. The chapter argues that we can overcome the difficulty: we can recognize and account for several different kinds of factual defectiveness while adhering to a very minimal notion of truth.

Keywords:   conditionals, disquotation, indeterminacy, interpersonal synonymy, non‐factuality, normative discourse, reference, supervaluation, truth, vagueness

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .