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Truth and the Absence of Fact$
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Hartry Field

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199242894

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001

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Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference

Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference

(p.177) 6 Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference
Truth and the Absence of Fact

Hartry Field (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

There is a natural argument for the incommensurability of scientific theories, based on examples where there is more than one equally good candidate for what an earlier term referred to. The chapter argues that such examples actually do not support incommensurability in any very serious sense. They do show a difficulty in applying standard semantic vocabulary in a determinate way to such earlier theories, but the chapter argues for a generalization of semantic vocabulary that largely avoids the difficulties. Includes a new postscript.

Keywords:   incommensurability, indeterminacy, reference, supervaluation, theory change, truth

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