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Truth and the Absence of Fact$
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Hartry Field

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199242894

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001

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Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content

Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content

Chapter:
(p.104) 4 Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content
Source:
Truth and the Absence of Fact
Author(s):

Hartry Field (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199242895.003.0004

Attempts to motivate and clarify a radically ‘deflationist’ view of the relations of ‘meaning that’ and ‘having the content that’, and to defend it against many of the arguments that are widely viewed as decisive against any such view. One of its claims is that standard work in the theory of reference (for instance, that of Kripke and Putnam) can be reconceived so as not to be primarily about reference at all. Includes a long postscript that, among other things, includes an account of how the degree to which behaviour is successful can be explained within a ‘deflationist’ framework.

Keywords:   belief, conceptual role, deflationism, interpersonal synonymy, Kripke, logical connectives, meaning, psychological explanation, Putnam, reference, representation, truth, truth‐conditions

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