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Preservation Versus the People?Nature, Humanity, and Political Philosophy$
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Mathew Humphrey

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199242672

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199242674.001.0001

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Conclusion

Conclusion

Framing, Irreplaceability, and the Ineliminability of Contingency

Chapter:
(p.179) Conclusion
Source:
Preservation Versus the People?
Author(s):

Mathew Humphrey (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199242674.003.0006

Here the threads of the previous chapters are pulled together, and problems posed in the putative relationship between ontology and axiology are considered. A serious problem with ecocentric argument is its attempt to eliminate political contingency from arguments for nature preservation, such contingency cannot be overcome by appeals to the existence of natural values. The argument is made that the ‘strong irreplaceability’ of natural entities provides sound (but not incontrovertible) grounds for nature preservation, and does so irrespective of any position with respect to the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide in axiology.

Keywords:   anthropocentrism, axiology, contingency, ecocentrism, framing, irreplaceability, natural values, nature, ontology

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