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Political InstitutionsDemocracy and Social Choice$
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Josep M. Colomer

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199241835

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019924183X.001.0001

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Politics and Social Choice

Politics and Social Choice

(p.1) 1 Politics and Social Choice
Political Institutions

Josep M. Colomer (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Social choice theory helps to design a research strategy. Three institutional variables producing different degrees of stability and different amounts of social utility are: (1) the dispersion of voters’ preferences, corresponding to simple and complex electorates; (2) the inclusiveness of different voting and electoral rules; and (3) the number of issue dimensions in single and separate elections, corresponding to schemes of unity and division of powers.

Keywords:   dispersion, division of powers, electoral rules, electorate, issue dimension, median voter, political equilibrium, social choice, social utility

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