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Conceptions of Truth$
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Wolfgang Künne

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199241316

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199241317.001.0001

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Some Questions About Truth

Some Questions About Truth

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Some Questions About Truth
Source:
Conceptions of Truth
Author(s):

Wolfgang Künne

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199241317.003.0001

The questions concerning truth that I plan to discuss are set up in a flowchart, and the answers to be defended in the course of the book are marked. I give my reasons for putting the Identity Theory aside (which takes truths to be facts), for bracketing Primitivism (which takes the concept of truth to be explanation‐resistant), and for shunning ‘deflationism/inflationism’ talk as underconstrained philosophical jargon. I explain what I mean by ‘alethic realism’ and ‘alethic anti‐realism’, and I argue (against Alston and D. Lewis) that the Denominalization Schema ‘It is true that p, iff p’ cannot be used as a lethal weapon against every anti‐realist conception of truth.

Keywords:   alethic realism, Alston, anti‐realism, deflationism, Denominalization Schema, fact, Identity Theory, Lewis, Primitivism

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