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New Essays on the A Priori$
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Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780199241279

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199241279.001.0001

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Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority

Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority

Chapter:
(p.150) 7 Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority
Source:
New Essays on the A Priori
Author(s):

Paul Horwich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199241279.003.0007

Paul Horwich attacks meaning‐based approaches to a priori justification and puts forward a view that explains apriority in terms of innateness and psychological indispensability. He concludes that while our practice of designating certain basic a priori beliefs as justified cannot be given epistemic support, it can be described and explained.

Keywords:   a priori justification, Paul Horwich, innateness, psychological indispensability

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