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Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour$
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Fernando Vega-Redondo

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198774723

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198774729.001.0001

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Static Analysis

Static Analysis

Chapter:
(p.11) 2 Static Analysis
Source:
Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour
Author(s):

Fernando Vega‐Redondo

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198774729.003.0002

Presents the basic theoretical framework and introduces the key notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). The chapter addresses the issue of existence of ESS, the relationship of ESS to the standard game‐theoretic equilibrium concepts (such as Nash Equilibrium), the considerations arising in asymmetric contexts, or the implications of finite populations. It closes with an example on the evolution of cheap talk.

Keywords:   asymmetric contests, cheap talk, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, finite populations, Nash Equilibrium, playing the field, random matching, refinements

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