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Development Microeconomics$
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Pranab Bardhan and Christopher Udry

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198773719

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198773714.001.0001

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Institutional Economics and the State in Economic Development

Institutional Economics and the State in Economic Development

Chapter:
(p.217) 17 Institutional Economics and the State in Economic Development
Source:
Development Microeconomics
Author(s):

Pranab Bardhan (Contributor Webpage)

Christopher Udry (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198773714.003.0017

This chapter looks at the institutions that are pertinent to economic development and at the institutional impediments to growth, drawing on several strands of the literature on organizational behaviour, including the New Institutional Economics. It begins with a discussion on informal mercantile institutions of trust, commitment, and enforcement, and then examines the strategic distributive conflicts behind institutional change. Next, it discusses the role of the state in building institutions, acknowledging the facts that there are states both strong and ‘soft’, and that the ‘soft budget constraint’ of the state gives rise to a credibility problem. An analysis of desirable state intervention—that which deals with market failures such as externalities and with coordination failures—and of distortional intervention involving rent‐seeking and corruption follows. This positive analysis of policy making includes a principal‐agent model in which the state acts like a Stackleberg leader.

Keywords:   corruption, distributive conflict, institutions, intervention, market failures, New Institutional Economics, organizational behaviour, policy‐making, rent‐seeking, soft budget constraint

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