Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Value JudgementImproving Our Ethical Beliefs$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

James Griffin

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198752318

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198752318.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 July 2019

The Good Life

The Good Life

Chapter:
(p.19) II The Good Life
Source:
Value Judgement
Author(s):

James Griffin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198752318.003.0003

Focuses on one kind of value: prudential values, i.e. the features that make an individual life good for the person living it, the ends of life, the quality of life. There are two main models in philosophy for prudential value judgements: the taste model (valuable because desired) and the perception model (desired because seen to be valuable). The chapter criticizes David Hume's version of the taste model, concluding that things are valuable only if they are subsumable under some general human interest. The best account of prudential values gives priority neither to value nor to desire; when developed, it ends up with a list of values that make any characteristic human life good. The chapter ends by questioning two key dualisms in ethics: reason/desire and objective/subjective.

Keywords:   ends of life, ethical objectivism, ethical subjectivism, Hume, practical reason, prudential value, quality of life, values

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .