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Value JudgementImproving Our Ethical Beliefs$
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James Griffin

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198752318

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198752318.001.0001

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Improving Our Ethical Beliefs

Improving Our Ethical Beliefs

Chapter:
(p.3) I Improving Our Ethical Beliefs
Source:
Value Judgement
Author(s):

James Griffin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198752318.003.0002

How should we criticize and improve our ethical beliefs? This chapter assesses the methods most employed, or given lip‐service to, by philosophers today: piecemeal appeal to intuition and striving for wide reflective equilibrium. It argues that both have merit, but neither goes nearly far enough. The method of wide reflective equilibrium has plausibility in the natural sciences, but ethics lacks two of the features necessary for this plausibility: beliefs of high reliability (in the natural sciences, perceptual beliefs) and a certain kind of system.

Keywords:   coherentism, ethical intuitions, ethics, foundationalism, method, reflective equilibrium

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