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Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies$
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Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780198297840

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019829784X.001.0001

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Parliamentary Democracy and Delegatio n

Parliamentary Democracy and Delegatio n

Chapter:
(p.55) 3 Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation
Source:
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
Author(s):

Kaare Strøm (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019829784X.003.0003

Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of parliamentary democracy is introduced to reveal that singularity and indirect delegation are key ingredients of delegation and accountability. Develops a delegation model that reveals more agency loss (policy slippage) in parliamentary democracy than in two versions of presidentialism. Parliamentary democracies use ex ante screening by cohesive political parties to protect against adverse selection. Delegation and accountability make parliamentary democracies more efficient, but frequently less transparent. Identifies the implications of different forms of parliamentarism, such as Westminster parliamentarism, pivotal parliamentarism, and constrained parliamentarism.

Keywords:   accountability, adverse selection, alternational parliamentarism, collegial presidentialism, competitive presidentialism, constrained parliamentarism, indirect delegation, moral hazard, pivotal parliamentarism, singularity, transparency, Westminster parliamentarism

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