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Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies$
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Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780198297840

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019829784X.001.0001

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Portugal: Changing Patterns of Delegation and Accountability under the President's Watchful Eye s

Portugal: Changing Patterns of Delegation and Accountability under the President's Watchful Eye s

Chapter:
(p.552) 18 Portugal: Changing Patterns of Delegation and Accountability under the President's Watchful Eyes
Source:
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
Author(s):

Octavio Amorim Neto

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019829784X.003.0018

Portugal’s blend of semi-presidentialism with multipartism has created a regime capable of generating a wide variety of governing solutions. This flexibility has helped consolidate one of Western Europe’s youngest democracies, but it is indicative of how complex the country’s delegation process is. The 1982 constitutional revision simplified the delegation process because it eliminated the possibility of presidential government. However, presidents have remained important in policy-making, particularly due to their use of the presidential veto, which is a unique characteristic of Portugal’s institutional design vis-à-vis its Western European partners. The President’s absolute veto over cabinet decrees constitutes an important constraint on the powerful Portuguese cabinet.

Keywords:   chief of state, closed list proportional representation, cohabitation, competing agents, constitutional tribunal, democratization, executive decree, premier-presidentialism, presidential veto power, semi-presidentialism

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