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Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies$
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Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780198297840

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019829784X.001.0001

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Germany: Multiple Veto Points, Informal Coordination, and Problems of Hidden Action

Germany: Multiple Veto Points, Informal Coordination, and Problems of Hidden Action

Chapter:
(p.347) 10 Germany: Multiple Veto Points, Informal Coordination, and Problems of Hidden Action
Source:
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
Author(s):

Thomas Saalfeld

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019829784X.003.0010

Argues that the German federal system was designed to avoid past problems with instability and abuse of power. This constitutional design disperses political power among many political and economic actors and leads to a complicated delegation chain. However, the German constitution successfully achieves democratic regime stability, a broad democratic consensus, and a high level of government and policy stability. The weaknesses of the German political system are efficiency problems (high transaction costs for policy change) and problems of political accountability and transparency.

Keywords:   accountability, basic Law, constitutional design, federalism, hidden action problems, informal coordination, regime stability, transaction costs, transparency, veto points

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