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Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy$
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Susan Mendus

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780198297819

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198297815.001.0001

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Impartiality in Political Philosophy

Impartiality in Political Philosophy

(p.7) 1 Impartiality in Political Philosophy
Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy

Susan Mendus (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Impartialist political philosophy must show how and why the priority of impartial justice can be reconciled with a belief in the permanence of pluralism. Although the argument from epistemological abstinence explains the permanence of pluralism, it cannot explain why justice should have motivational priority. It delivers only, and at most, a modus vivendi defence of toleration. The way to attain a defence that is more than a modus vivendi is to ground political impartialism in moral impartialism.

Keywords:   epistemological abstinence, justice, moral impartialism, motivation, pluralism, political impartialism, toleration

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