- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction: An Historical Overview
- 1 Making Sense of the EMU Negotiations
- 2 EMU, the Mitterrand Presidency, and French Political Tradition
- 3 The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Barre, Giscard D'estaing, and Pompidou
- 4 Challenging the ‘D‐Mark Zone’: Agenda‐Setting on EMU and the Strategy of Indirection Under Mitterrand, 1981–1989
- 5 French Strategy for the IGC: Making EMU Irreversible
- 6 EMU, the Kohl Chancellorship, and German Political Tradition: The Legacy of Adenauer and Erhard
- 7 The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Schiller and Schmidt
- 8 Negotiating EMU Around the German Model: Agenda‐Setting Under the Kohl Chancellorship, 1982–1989
- 9 German Strategy for the IGC
- 10 Italian Policy Beliefs About EMU: External Discipline Versus Internal Protection
- 11 Framing EMU as a New Vincolo Esterno: Policy Entrepreneurs, Co‐Ordination, and Reflection in Italy, 1988–1990
- 12 Italy and the IGC: Negotiating External Discipline, Avoiding Exclusion, 1990–1991
- 13 The British Political Tradition and EMU: Policy Legacies, Beliefs, and Co‐Ordination
- 14 Resisting EMU: Political Strategy, Policy Entrepreneurship, and Policy Reflection Before the IGC
- 15 John Major: Between the Party and the IGC
- 16 Jacques Delors as Policy Entrepreneur and Ingénieur of the EMU Negotiations: Agenda‐Setting and Oiling the Wheels
- 17 Conclusions and Reflections
- Appendix: List of Interviewees
- References
- Name Index
- Index
Introduction: An Historical Overview
Introduction: An Historical Overview
- Chapter:
- (p.1) Introduction: An Historical Overview
- Source:
- The Road To Maastricht
- Author(s):
Kenneth Dyson (Contributor Webpage)
Kevin Featherstone (Contributor Webpage)
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
The negotiation of EMU is situated in an historical context, notably the mounting tensions in the post‐war Bretton Woods system, the Hague Summit of 1969, the eventual collapse of Bretton Woods and the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978–79. An account is given of the relaunch of EMU in 1988, of the start of the detailed negotiations, of the nature and significance of the Maastricht Agreement, and of the end game in 1991.
Keywords: Bretton Woods, EMU, European Monetary System, Hague Summit, Maastricht Treaty, negotiation, Werner Plan
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction: An Historical Overview
- 1 Making Sense of the EMU Negotiations
- 2 EMU, the Mitterrand Presidency, and French Political Tradition
- 3 The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Barre, Giscard D'estaing, and Pompidou
- 4 Challenging the ‘D‐Mark Zone’: Agenda‐Setting on EMU and the Strategy of Indirection Under Mitterrand, 1981–1989
- 5 French Strategy for the IGC: Making EMU Irreversible
- 6 EMU, the Kohl Chancellorship, and German Political Tradition: The Legacy of Adenauer and Erhard
- 7 The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Schiller and Schmidt
- 8 Negotiating EMU Around the German Model: Agenda‐Setting Under the Kohl Chancellorship, 1982–1989
- 9 German Strategy for the IGC
- 10 Italian Policy Beliefs About EMU: External Discipline Versus Internal Protection
- 11 Framing EMU as a New Vincolo Esterno: Policy Entrepreneurs, Co‐Ordination, and Reflection in Italy, 1988–1990
- 12 Italy and the IGC: Negotiating External Discipline, Avoiding Exclusion, 1990–1991
- 13 The British Political Tradition and EMU: Policy Legacies, Beliefs, and Co‐Ordination
- 14 Resisting EMU: Political Strategy, Policy Entrepreneurship, and Policy Reflection Before the IGC
- 15 John Major: Between the Party and the IGC
- 16 Jacques Delors as Policy Entrepreneur and Ingénieur of the EMU Negotiations: Agenda‐Setting and Oiling the Wheels
- 17 Conclusions and Reflections
- Appendix: List of Interviewees
- References
- Name Index
- Index
