Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Justice and PunishmentThe Rationale of Coercion$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Matt Matravers

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198295730

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198295731.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 October 2019

A Constructivist Theory of Moral Norms

A Constructivist Theory of Moral Norms

Chapter:
(p.205) 8 A Constructivist Theory of Moral Norms
Source:
Justice and Punishment
Author(s):

Matt Matravers (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198295731.003.0009

The argument is that agents have reason, although not a decisive reason, jointly to make the existential commitment needed to ground morality. These reasons appeal to psychological evidence about well‐being. There are important sources of well‐being that cannot be tapped without making the commitment to live together with others on moral terms. The nature and scope of the moral community understood as the product of such joint commitment is examined.

Keywords:   commitment, moral community, morality, well‐being

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .