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Justice and PunishmentThe Rationale of Coercion$
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Matt Matravers

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198295730

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198295731.001.0001

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Self‐Interest and the Commitment to Morality

Self‐Interest and the Commitment to Morality

(p.178) 7 Self‐Interest and the Commitment to Morality
Justice and Punishment

Matt Matravers (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Argues that the better realization of the agent's non‐social interests is only one condition for moral cooperation; it does not provide decisive reason to enter such cooperation. Instead, what is needed is an existential commitment to the moral; a commitment that is ungrounded but not irrational. It is argued that such a choice is plausible if constructivist theory drops its commitment to the assumption of non‐tuism, and that there are independent grounds for this assumption to be dropped.

Keywords:   commitment, constructivism, co‐operation, morality, non‐tuism, self‐interest

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