Impartial Justice, Motivation, and Punishment
Impartial Justice, Motivation, and Punishment
It is argued that a premiss of the fundamental moral equality of persons is built into the foundations of impartialist theories of justice. The inclusion of this premise means that the demands of justice are disconnected from the personal perspective adopted by the agent and appear to him as alien restrictions on the pursuit of his good. Thus, coercion is needed to fill the gap between morality and self‐interest.
Keywords: coercion, good, impartialism, justice, moral equality, moral motivation, morality, self‐interest
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