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Justice and PunishmentThe Rationale of Coercion$
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Matt Matravers

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198295730

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198295731.001.0001

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The Scope of Impartial Justice

The Scope of Impartial Justice

Chapter:
(p.97) 4 The Scope of Impartial Justice
Source:
Justice and Punishment
Author(s):

Matt Matravers (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198295731.003.0005

Having argued that theories of punishment need to be embedded in wider moral theories, this chapter considers impartial theories of justice, such as those offered by Rawls and Barry. These aspire to give an account of the justification of the use of public power that does not depend on any particular, comprehensive conception of the good. By considering the relationship of impartial justice and morality, and testing the scope of impartial theories of justice, an argument is constructed to show that impartialist theory cannot give an account of the kind of rules relevant to punishment within the constraints of justificatory neutrality.

Keywords:   Brian Barry, good, impartialism, justice, morality, neutrality, punishment, John Rawls

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