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Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure$
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Oliver Hart

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198288817

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198288816.001.0001

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The Property Rights Approach

The Property Rights Approach

Chapter:
(p.29) 2 The Property Rights Approach
Source:
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Author(s):

Oliver Hart (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198288816.003.0003

The neoclassical, principal‐agent and transaction costs theories cannot by themselves explain firm boundaries. This chapter describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—based on the idea that power and control matter when contracts are incomplete. If the terms of a transaction can always be renegotiated, the incentives of a party to undertake relationship‐specific investments will depend crucially on the ability to control the use of productive assets when renegotiation takes place (the hold‐up problem). In this context, asset ownership becomes an essential source of power and different ownership structures will affect the severity of the hold‐up problem. The author presents a model that illustrates the benefits and costs of integration. In the absence of wealth constraints, firm boundaries are chosen to allocate power optimally among the parties to a transaction. An implication of the theory is that, ceteris paribus, a party is more likely to own an asset if he or she has an important investment decision. The theory also predicts that complementarities make integration more likely and, conversely, that independent assets should be owned separately. Finally, the author considers whether the theory's predictions actually match up with observed organizational arrangements.

Keywords:   bargaining power, control, hold‐up problem, incentives, incomplete contracts, investment, ownership structure, property rights, renegotiation

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