Bounded Rationality and Retrospection
Bounded Rationality and Retrospection
Argues that many of the weaknesses of game theory arise from weaknesses in how economists model individual (dynamic) behaviour: with hyper‐rational and forward‐looking, farsighted individuals. Progress is likely to be made by re‐examining our models of behaviour, incorporating bounds to individual rationality and modelling individuals who are more retrospective, learning adaptively from the past.
Keywords: adaptive learning, behavioural modelling, bounded rationality, dynamic choice, game theory, hyper‐rationality, retrospection
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
