Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonathan Bennett

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250920

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250924.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 23 July 2019

Hume on Causation, Negatively

Hume on Causation, Negatively

Chapter:
(p.245) Chapter 35 Hume on Causation, Negatively
Source:
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2
Author(s):

Jonathan Bennett

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198250924.003.0015

Hume argues that we have no idea of a necessitating tie between any pair of events, and no basis for conjecturing—as Locke did—that such a tie exists. In the course of discussing this, he says he will ‘beat about the neighbouring fields’ and discuss the question of what is going on when we infer effects from causes, and the question of why we think it necessary that every event has a cause. The former question is directly linked to his own positive views on causation; the latter is not. Hume argues that there is no real causal necessity from the premise (shared with Descartes) that no state of the world absolutely necessitates any subsequent state. His reasons for tying causal necessity to absolute necessity are explained and defended.

Keywords:   causation, Descartes, Hume, Locke, necessity

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .