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Nietzsche and Metaphysics$
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Peter Poellner

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250630

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250630.001.0001

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Scepticism

Scepticism

Chapter:
(p.29) 2 Scepticism
Source:
Nietzsche and Metaphysics
Author(s):

Peter Poellner (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198250630.003.0002

Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of substance qua substratum for properties; the Lockean ontology of powers inherent in external objects; the construal of the self as either mental substance or transcendental subjects; atomism; and the belief in the explanatory powers of Newtonian force. It is argued that there is a pervasive general line of scepticism in Nietzsche's later thought concerning the possibility of knowledge as rationally justified true belief. The chapter concludes with a defence of Nietzsche's general scepticism against a variety of countervailing arguments.

Keywords:   atomism, causation, external world, force, justified true belief, scepticism, self, substance

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