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Value and ContextThe Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge$
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Alan Thomas

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250173

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0198250177.001.0001

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Non‐Objectivism and Internal Realism

Non‐Objectivism and Internal Realism

Chapter:
(p.130) 6 Non‐Objectivism and Internal Realism
Source:
Value and Context
Author(s):

Alan Thomas (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198250177.003.0007

This chapter discusses the non-objectivist position. The non-objectivist argument emerges from an immanent, transcendental placing of the various ways in which we conceive of different areas of thought or language. Rather than announcing itself as a sceptical conclusion, the sceptical line of reflection that emerges can be allowed, in Tractarian fashion, to show its truth. It is in this way that the non-objectivist critique emerges as the most powerful means of undermining the cognitivist argument traced so far. Underpinned by a worked-out programme in the philosophy of truth, namely minimalism, non-objectivism is also powered by a distinctive vision of a modern society.

Keywords:   non-objectivism, truth, internal realism, cognitivism, Bernard Williams

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