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A Subject With No ObjectStrategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics$
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John P. Burgess and Gideon Rosen

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250128

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250126.001.0001

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Miscellaneous Strategies

Miscellaneous Strategies

Chapter:
(p.173) A Miscellaneous Strategies
Source:
A Subject With No Object
Author(s):

John P. Burgess (Contributor Webpage)

Gideon Rosen (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198250126.003.0006

Indicates very briefly a variety of further strategies, beginning with modifications and combinations of the three that were discussed in the preceding three chapters. The more exotic strategies are those based on so‐called substitutional quantifiers, or predicate‐functor logic, and on dialectical logic, which admits inconsistent objects and incomplete objects. Argues that these exotic strategies are philosophically problematic in a way the strategies considered earlier were not.

Keywords:   dialectical logic, incomplete objects, inconsistent objects, predicate‐functor logic, substitutional quantifiers

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